ABSTRACT Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a widely implemented structure to achieve remote measurement and control in many iron and steel plants. In traditional consideration, more attention on physical network separation methods is paid to isolate the SCADA system from management network to keep SCADA in a considered ''safe'' state. In addition, lots of security solution providers are focusing on the network side security assurance without involving the SCADA communication level protection. This paper investigates a new trusted-ID referenced key scheme for securing SCADA communications efficiently. The advanced encryption standard algorithm is used in the data transmission for its fast calculating speed, and the elliptic curve cryptography digital signature algorithm is used to confirm the data package that is from the right ID which can avoid the measured values and the control instructions to be maliciously modified by attacker. This solution for securing SCADA communication provides an efficient way to protect the data and protocol between the controllers and the remote terminal units (RTUs), and offers an authentication for the communication, which can avoid Man-In-The-Middle attack. Random numbers are used as a session key that can avoid the replay attack. cipher-block chaining mode message authentication code calculation is used to meet the data integrity requirement. Gong Needham Yahalom logic is used to prove the security of this solution, and an example is given to verify its validity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Iron and steel plants are typical process manufacturing industry based on the synergy of material flow, energy flow and information flow. The data transmission and exchage play an important role in the whole process. SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) system is widely used in iron and steel plants to deal with this massive amount of data in very short period of time. The data include the value measured from sensors such as the measurement of pressure, flow, temperature of gas, water and the control instructions the controller send to the actuators e.g. the valves etc. that are very important to the control system. Once the data is tampered by adversaries, the results would be severe, e.g the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Qiang Yang.
control process can be ruined by maliciously manipulated instructions which will result in massive physical damage [1] or the abnormal value will change the production plan. So the data security in SCADA system is the vornerstone for the process control or even the entire plant.
The security of SCADA systems are lagging behind the development of internet both in the intrusion detection for the networks and in the communication secure protection. Physical isolate the SCADA system from management network is the usual measure to keep the SCADA systems in a considered 'safe'. But this confidence of physical isolation can be collapsed by unknown U disk or disgruntled employee. In 2015 NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) advised that SCADA systems should be designed to include encryption and authentication between devices in order to make it very difficult to reverse engineer protocols and forge packets on control system networks to avoid MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) Attacks [2] .
The vulnerabilities in the protocols in SCADA systems as K. C. Mahapatra analyzed in [3] that communication protection in SCADA systems has been dramatically ignored, and this will cause fatal damages and losses [4] . PLCs are the main controllers in the SCADA systems in iron and steel plants, and MITM Attack and Replay Attack are listed to be the common threats to PLCs not dealing with encrypted packets in [5] . Other main threats in SCADA systems are listed in [6] : APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats), Lack of Data Integrity and DoS (Denial of Service) Attacks.
More and more security solutions emerged to prevent the SCADA system from being attacked. Apart from antivirus and intrusion detection systems for network solutions [7] , [8] , some encryption proposals to secure the SCADA communication with different key exchange schemes are discussed.
In [9] , [10] , Dawson et al. proposed master key preloaded mode using symmetric algorithm, and a same master key should be loaded first into each SCADA communication entities so as to assure generating session key from this same master key. Symmetric encryption is used in Kang et al.'s solution [11] , but it raised a contradiction between the frequency to change the session key and the net traffic which will probably cause the master key be exposed or time delay even a communication failure. Kang proposed QoS (Quality of Service) to calculate an optimal point to give a tradeoff between the key distribution period and the network traffic. But once an entity's master key exposed, the security proof of entire system will be collapsed.
Based on [11] , [12] Rezai et al. proposed a public key infrastructure ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key exchange solution to generate and exchange session symmetric key with Elliptic Curve algorithm under Diffie-Hellman mechanism. But there is a MITM Attack risk for this solution. If there is an adversary C stay in-between two legal entities A and B, C can intercept the communication between A and B without being identified. So this kind of MITM Attack can not be avoided if the initial shared master key is compromised in the key scheme proposed in [12] .
In [13] Lim provided an ID-based key scheme for SCADA system. The additional KDC (Key Distribution Center) or PKG (Private Key Generator) role involvement and another security protection required for the acquiring ID based private key procedure which will increase the communication overhead and introduce new vulnerabilities.
In [14] Lim et al. use HMAC for message authentication but without data encryption to decrease the overhead for computing. But the switches, or nodes in the networks through which the data pass are vulnerable to both the intruders or the disgruntled employees. Once the data are declosed the adversaries with knowledge of the procedures can analyze the parameters of the controlled process by analyzing the declosed data. They can derive the abnormal paramaters from the normal ones which can cause the system to fail.
To solve these problems, the vendors should take the responsbility, but in the vendors solutions most equipments should be relaced. To most old plants, replacing all of the IEDs and RTUs is impractical because of the high cost. We need a solution as a transition. So in this paper we provide a solution of a new trusted-ID referenced scheme to secure SCADA communication efficiently with the existing equipments in the plants with the help of sDTU (secure Data Transmission Unit).
A. THE SCADA COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE
In iron and steel plants, the SCADA network communication often uses the three layered structure as Fig. 1 demonstrates. The communications in the bottom layer are between the RTUs (Remote Terminal Unit), IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Device) and the master station or the sub master stations. The RTUs or the IEDs in the remote side send the values measured from sensors to the PLCs, and the PLCs send the control instructions to the actuators, e.g. the valves, and simultaneously send the data to the databases of the control stations and HMIs (Human Machine Interface) in the control side.
The communications in the middle layer are between the controllers or the computers of different sub prodecures. The data include the parameters dilivered among defferent sub procedures which will impact the join of them e.g. in Fig. 1 , the temprature and pressure from the sensors of Hot Blast subprocedure will be send to PLC2 which control this procedure, and the PLC1 in the Burden procedure will ask these values from PLC2 to make the burden decision. At the same time, these informations will be send to the HMI and the database in the corporate LAN.
The communications in the top layer are between the computers in the corporate LAN, and the data include the production plan and personal informations of administrators and operaters which are vital for the secure of the networks and the control of the whole system. IPsec and VPNs can be used in the top layer and the middle layer to encrypt the data in the transmission channel. Our solution sDTU is used in the bottom layer to avoid MITM Attack and Replay Attack.
PLCs from different producers such as Seimens, Rockwell and Schneider are used in the above structure. PLCs of different brand use different communication protocols like Ethernet/IP, Profinet, Modbus/TCP. Only few of the protocol above uses encryption, and not with enough security. L. Cheng analyzed the encryption used in S7Commplus in [15] and advised to encrypt the whole packets instead of the key byte encryption. Make the communication structure of Fig. 2 as the example, two encryption approaches can be used: link encryption and end-to-end encryption.
Link encryption is an approach to communications security by enciphering and deciphering all traffic at each network routing point (e.g. network switch, or node through which it passes) until arrival to its final destination. In most cases there will be several sub-master stations in middle layer to act as a relay which will be the vulnerable points likely to be attacked. End-to-end encryption is a system of communication where only the authorized communicating users can understand the messages. In principle, it prevents potential attackers from being able to access the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt the conversation.
In this scenario, to avoid the vulnerability caused by link encryption, end-to-end encryption is adopted for the data to be communicated between master stations and RTUs with Ethernet.
B. CONTRIBUTION
In order to avoid the shortcomings in [9] - [13] and [14] , we proposed a new trusted-ID referenced session key scheme solution for end-to-end secure communication.
This solution for securing SCADA communication provides an efficient way to protect the data and protocol between the controller and the RTU, and offers an authentication for the communication, which can avoid MITM Attack and Replay Attack effectively.
In this solution, we make three main contributions: phase and the online phase. The offline phase is used to achieve the digital signatures of the IDs and the sDTUs, and put the signatures, the IDs and the keys in to the sDTUs. The offline implementation won't increase too much communication overhead. In the online phase the two entities first conduct a mutual authentication by verifying the signature and this is the way to avoid the MITM Attack. If any signature verified invalid, the communication is attacked and the process will stop, otherwise, the process go on to generate random number as the session key. Then verify the session key to avoid the Replay Attack. After the session key is verified to be valid, the process go on to decrypt the data packgaes. 3) With the help of an add-on sDTUs, the sDTUs can be a mountable security module positioned as Fig.3 illustrates in a general communication environment or a security chip that can be embedded in the IEDs and RTUs. The form of sDTU depends on the demand of the system. All of the security information should be stored VOLUME 7, 2019 inside the embedded anti-tamper secure chip without exposing to outside, and other critical information such as the paired IDs' information list, can only be modified with authorization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is a review of SCADA key schemes. Section III is a discussion of the proposed scheme in detail, a proof for the security of the scheme and an example are offered. Section IV is the analysis for the performance. Section V is the conclusion and future studies.
II. A REVIEW OF SCADA KEY SCHEMES A. BACKGROUND ON CRYPTOSYSTEMS
The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm is one of the most widely used symmetric key block cipher algorithm to encrypt/ decrypt blocked data being transmitted between the master side and the remote side in the SCADA system because of its fast calculating speed and high security, so we use it in the encryption and decryption of the communicating data after session key established.
Apart from symmetric algorithm, public key cryptosystems perform encryption and decryption in an asymmetric way. The traditional public key cryptosystem is RSA which is based on a hard problem of factoring large numbers.
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) [16] , [17] is an efficient alternative to RSA. Compared with RSA, the major advantage of ECC is that it offers comparable security with smaller key size. ECCDSA (Elliptic Curve Cryptography Digital Signature Algorithm) is the digital signature algorithm based on ECC. For current and future security levels ECCDSA offers better performance values than RSA based signatures.
In ID based cryptography [18] a user can choose an arbitrary string as its public key. An IP address or MAC address can become a user agent's public key. A trusted third party, named as the PKG, will generate a private key based on the public key of the requesting user. Using its public key a receiver can authenticate the sender by validating the ID based digital signature, which was generated with the sender's private key.
The major advantage of ID based cryptosystems is that no PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is needed for key management. Compared with other cryptosystems ID based cryptosystems are quite secure.
Most SCADA secure communication proposals use the session key to encrypt the data transmitting between the SCADA entities, i.e. from master station to bottom layer PLCs, RTUs and IEDs, or first to sub-master station and then forward to bottom layer devices.
And the three kinds of session key schemes mentioned previously will be reviewed hereafter.
B. PRELOADED SYMMETRIC MASTER KEY
In order to generate a temporary session key, there must be a preloaded master key existing in each communication entitiy, let's assume A and B as the two SCADA entities need to setup a secure communication channel. And K m is the preloaded master key shared by A and B. Either A or B can be acted as the session initiator to start the procedure of session key generating. We can suppose A start the key generating procedure, the related steps described as below:
Step 1: A: Generates a random number RND A ;
Step 2: A: Ciphers RND A with predefined algorithm and uses K m as the encryption key and output {RND A } K m ;
Step 3:
Step 4: B: Decrypts {RND A } K m with the same algorithm and the same master key shared with A, so as to recover
Step 5: Both A and B use RND A as the temporary session key to securely communicate with each other. But for this solution, once an entity's master key exposed, the security proof of entire system will be collapsed.
Even there are some variants in different preloaded master key proposals, but the basic processes are almost alike.
C. ID-BASED KEY SCHEME
The ID-based key scheme uses any bi-linear mapẽ :
and G 2 are cyclic groups of the same order. Between 2 groups, G 1 and G 2 as long as a variant of Computational Deffie-Hellman problem in G 1 is difficult. This meets the requirement of Shamir who asked a public key encryption scheme in which the public key can be an arbitrary string.
As Dan Boneh et al. discussed in [19] Weil paring on elliptic curve is one of the bi-linear map can be used for the ID-based encryption.
Unlike certificate-based PKI which requires a CA (Certificate Authority) , the ID-based scheme needs a KGC (Key Generation Center), also called PKG with function of generating secure communication entities' private key from their ID strings. But this will increase the communication overhead and introduce new vulnerabilities.
Reference [20] defines some other kinds of bilinear map parings over elliptic curve to achieve ID-based algorithms.
D. ECDH KEY SCHEME
The ECDH key scheme has been studied for a long time, and already is accepted as the ISO/IEC standards.
If there are two entities A and B need to share a secret value, they first find an elliptic curve E(F p ), and each generates a public key pair (K priA , K pubA ) and (K priB , K pubB ), both K priA and K priB are randomly selected in the range of [1, n] and should be kept secret by each other, while K pubA and K pubB are used as public key and calculated as:
where g is the base point of E(F p ).
Then the shared secret value between A and B can be produced using formula as denoted below:
Since K priA and K priB are secretly kept by A and B, nobody else can obtain the value of K priAB without knowing either
If there is an adversary C stay between two legal entities A and B, the previously discussed shared secret K priA × K priB × g will be replaced by C as: K priA × K priC × g as a shared secret between A and C, and K priC × K priB × g as another shared secret shared between C and B. This kind of MITM Attack can not be avoided.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This paper proposed a procedure plus an ECCDSA algorithm implementation to achieve a high-performance and secured session key generation scheme for SCADA communication protection.
Two phases have been defined in this proposal: the offline phase and the online phase, and each phase will conduct several steps in order to complete the whole procedure.
A MSK (Master Signing Key) will be generated first, and is used for signing identity and public key information of each sDTU.
The key pair of each sDTU with a reference of entity's ID are also generated and loaded into the SM(Secure Module) in each sDTU together with the public key of MSK.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
The security keystone of ECC is based on the difficulty of solving DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem) on EC (Elliptic Curve) over finite field F p .
The EC over finite field F p denoted as: E(F p ) defines a set of n points (n is called the order of the curve) satisfying equation:
where p is a prime number and with constrains:
The analog of modular exponentiation is the point multiplication operation where the point addition operation is performed as many times as the multiplier value.
When P is a point on the EC, k is the number of Ps to be added up, the sum is represented as kP, the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) problem is to find the unknown k from P and kP.
Among the points of E(F p ), a base point g can be found so that all of the other (n − 1) points among this EC points set can be calculated by g with different times of self addition :
So P can be exposed publicly, and k must be kept privately, they are a pair of cryptographic keys to encrypt information or to sign a digital signature with related procedures. ECCDSA is to verify a signature result with the public key to prove the result is really generated by the related private key with ECC algorithm.
The digital signature generating process:
(1) Generate a random private key as K pri , g(x g , y g ) is the base point of the EC, generate a message digest m d with Hash;
(2) From (1) we can get:
The key pair of A is (K Apri , K Apub (X A , Y A )), based on elliptic curve E(F p ) with the order of n; (3) Randomly select a k in the range of [1, n] 
(4) (r, s) is the signature; The signature verification process:
(1) The same message digest m d will be generated; (2) Calculate:
(3) Calculate curve point:
(4) If r ≡ X A mod n, the signature is valid. The signature is correct because:
The MSK pair is generated under ECC algorithm by the HSM (Hardware Security Module). From (1), (2), (3), the public part MSK pub will be self-signed with its private part MSK pri to get the signature {H MSKpub } −MSK pri = (r MSK , s MSK ):
2) ID ASSIGNMENT AND SIGNATURE Each sDTU will be assigned a string as the unique ID sequence e.g. use the entity's MAC and IP address.
Then we can calculate the Hash of this ID:
Generate a random private key for sDTU as K pri , g(x g , y g ) is the base point of NIST 192, from (2) we can get:
K pri is the private key of sDTU, K pub1 and K pub2 are the related public key.
Calculate the Hash of the data sequence ID K pub2 , we get
In NIST 192, n = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF F99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831, from (3) we can sign H ID K pub2 with MSK pri to get the signature
At last load the
MSK pub into the anti-temper SM embedded in the sDTU so as to assure K pri being kept secretly, and all of other value can not be modified without authorized permission. The process is shown in Fig. 4 . 
Remark 1:
The offline phase is used to achieve the digital signatures of the IDs and the sDTUs, and put the signatures, the IDs and the keys into the sDTUs. The offline implementation won't increase too much communication overhead.
C. THE ONLINE PHASE
When the two sDTUs need to communicate with each other, one of them will initiate the session and start the authentication process before a secure communication channel can be established as shown in Fig. 5 . 
1) INITIATE
Assume sDTU A and sDTU B will communicate as the secure channel initiator. B will send its ID B , public key K Bpub2 , as well as the digital signature {H (ID B K Bpub2 ) } −MSK pri to A.
2) AUTHENTICATION
From (4), (5), (6) , the signature of {H MSKpub } −MSKpri will first be verified with MSK pub . The process is: (10) If r MSK ≡ X P mod n, the signature is valid. Then A and B will conduct a mutual authentication to verify the signature of {H (ID A K Apub2 ) } −MSK pri and {H (ID B K Bpub2 ) } −MSK pri respectively with MSK pub . If any signature verified invalid, the process will stop, and secure communication will abort.
3) SESSION KEY GENERATION
(1) A will verify {H (ID B K Bpub2 ) } −MSK pri by (10), generate a random number RND A1 as session key, encrypt it with K Apri , K Bpub1 and K Bpub2 as C 2 .
Then generate another random number RND A2 . (11) and (12): 
4) ENCRYPTION WITH SESSION KEY
Once the session key has been shared successfully, the endto-end secure communication channel will be set up.
In order to assure the integrity and confidentiality communication requirement as well as counterfeiting the replay attack, the CBC-MAC(Cipher-Block Chaining mode Message Authentication Code) calculation should be implemented. The encryption process in Fig. 6 is as: (1) The sender generates a random number as initial value; (2) Split the plaintext into several blocks, each block meets the size request of the symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g. in AES algorithm the block size can be 16 bytes; (3) No matter the last block size is exactly 16 bytes or not there should be a mandatory padding appended, the total overhead is at most 2 blocks; (4) Exclusive or the initial value with the first block of data, and then encrypt the result with key output the first encrypted block; (5) Then exclusive or the first block output with the second block of plaintext and encrypt again, and continue till the last block; (6) Since the last block should contain a patterned padding bytes, e.g. 0x80, 0x00, 0x00. . . 0x00, if the receiver decrypts the massage without finding this special padding, then there must be some unauthorized modification of the data, and the data should be rejected. This acts as the MAC. Remark 3: The encryption can meet confidential requirement and CBC-MAC calculation for data integrity approach can be achieved.
D. MULTI-ENDS CONSIDERATION
In the above sections we discussed the general end-to-end solution in details, and we assumed that each end is managed by the same master station, but they can communicate with each other without visiting the master station any more after the offline procedure.
If we consider the one-to-multi scenario, such as one master station communicates with several remote terminals. The master station can act as entity A and any other remote terminals which need to communicate with this master station should act as the different entity Bs, e.g. B 1 , B 2 , . . . . . . , B n . In this way the master station is one of the communication ends, and its asymmetric key pair will not be treated as the authority to sign communication ends' ID plus public key as described above. But the master station's ID and public key together with the mentioned different entity Bs' ID and public key should be signed by an up level system asymmetric key pair as the authority. And in this scenario, the so-called master station can manage a trusted ID list after it complete the above discussed key scheme process. Since each communication channel will generate its own session key, the master station can index each session key with their trusted IDs managed by itself.
E. SECURITY PROOF
BAN(Burrows-Abadi-Needham) Logic [21] is widely used to analyze the completeness of protocols. GNY (GongNeedham-Yahalom) logic [22] is the extension over BAN and overcomes BAN's limitation. So GNY logic is adopted here to analyze the security of the proposed key scheme. Firstly, some formulae and statements used in the GNY logic will be introduced, then the goals and assumptions will be set to prove the key scheme is valid by GNY logic.
1) FORMULAE AND STATEMENTS
In the GNY logic, a formula is a name used to indicate a bit string, with a particular value in a run [22] . In order to describe the GNY logic, first let symbols X and Y range over formulae. Then, let's introduce some formulae used in the key scheme protocol proof, for the complete list of all logical postulates is described in [22] .
(1) (X , Y ): conjunction of two formulae X and Y . Additionally, another formula based on the proposed scheme will defined, and the similar statements should be assigned as with the +K / − K asymmetrically encrypt and decrypt.
A basic statement reflects some property of a formula. Let symbols P and Q be principals. The followings are statements used in our proof.
(1) P X : P is told formula X .
(2) P X : P possesses formula X . (3) P |∼ X : P once conveyed formula X . (4) P |≡ (X ): P believes that X is fresh.
(5) P |≡ φ(X ): P believes that X is recognizable. (6) P |≡ P S ← → Q: P believes that S is a suitable secret for P and Q. (7) P |⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X . (8) P * X : P is told that a formula X which did not convey previously in the current run. (9) P |≡ | +K − − → Q: P believes that +K is a suitable public key of Q.
2) PROTOCOL DESCRIPTIONS AND GOALS
In order to fit the GNY logic, some notations are changed and the proposed key scheme protocol is transformed into the form of P −→ Q : (X ). The MSK's private key is denoted as −K , and the corresponding public key is denoted as +K . Assume entity A as the secure channel setup initiator, A will generate two random numbers, one is denoted as RND A for future shared key, the other is N A as to generate the confirmation ticket from B. Private key of A is denoted as −K Apri , its related public key is denoted as +K Apub , private key of B is denoted as −K Bpri , its related public key is denoted as +K Bpub .
(
Next, we describe the goals in the key scheme protocol.
a: MESSAGE CONTENT AUTHENTICATION
Goal 1: A believes the message in the first run is recognizable.
Goal 2: B believes the message in the second run is recognizable. 
3) ASSUMPTION LIST
Reference [22] gives out some logical postulates:
P * X P X (13)
According to the postulates above, some assumptions are made as follow:
1. Secret key RND A and nonce N A are generated by A in the proposed protocol, so A possesses RND A and N A and believes they are fresh and recognizable, A also possesses the private key −K Apri and the public key +K Apub2 , and MS's public key +K , since they are stored in A, besides A generates RND A as the session key, so A believes that RND A is the secret share between A and B.
B possesses −K Bpub2 , +K Bpri , as well as MS's public key +K , since they are stored in B.
4) AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING GNY LOGIC
Use GNY logic to analyze our protocol. A complete list of all logical postulates and the index in the list is provided in [22] to show how to achieve the goals.
a: THE FIRST RUN
From (13), (14), (15), we can get (21) .
Since A possesses the MS's public key +K , and is told
From (16), (18), we can get (22) . Since A possesses the Hash H (ID B ||K Bpub2 ), then A is entitled to believe that (ID B ||K Bpub2 ) is recognizable, therefore A also believes
Since B possesses MS's public key +K as A does, so we can also conclude that B believes:
Since MS is considered as the authority over both A and B's public key signing, according Jurisdiction Rules (23), we can
From (17), (20), we can get (24) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
If all of the following four conditions hold: i) B receives a formula RND A , encrypted with A's private key and B's public key;
ii) B possesses the corresponding A's public key and B's private key;
iii) B believes the public key is A's; iv) P believes RND A is recognizable. We use NIST-192 curve to generate MSK key pair. Firstly we generate a random MSK private key MSK pri , then calculate MSK pri × G obtain the public key point MSK pub (X p , Y P ) shown in Table 2 . 
2) ENTITY A
Next we generate a random private key K Apri , from (8) we can obtain point (X PA1 , Y PA1 ) and point (X PA2 , Y PA2 ) as shown in Table 3 . 
3) ENTITY B
The same process with entity A as shown in Table 4 . 
4) DIGITAL SIGNATURE
We calculate Hash(ID A , X PA2 ) and Hash(ID B , X PB2 ), then signature with MSK pri respectively by (9) as shown in Table 5 . From (4), (5), (9), (10) the signature of entity A and entity B can be verified.
5) SESSION KEY GENERATION
Entity A produces a random number as the will be shared symmetric key, the public key of A and B, K Apub1 , K Apub2 , K Bpub1 , K Bpub2 , are known each other. From (10) , (11) we can calculate C 1 and C 2 as shown in Table 6 .
Add previously added, the RND A will be correctly recovered and be used as the session key to encrypt the data.
6) ATTACK RESISTING
Scenario I: If an adversary C pretends to be B stay in the middle of A and B, when it tries to recover the RND A , it can only use a guessed K Bpri e.g. even only 1 bit different from the real K Bpri , assume the guessed as shown in Table 7 . Uses ID B , X PB2 , R B , S B , MSK pub (X p , Y p ) as input parameters, and the signature verification result should be invalid.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. COMPARISON Table 9 shows the comparisons between the existing methods in [9] - [14] and our proposal. We can see that our proposal overcomes the shortcomings in four aspects: anti peer compromise attack, anti MITM Attack, no additiaonal KDC required and encrypt the whole packets.
B. ID TRUSTED
In the proposal scheme, the entities' ID information is used as the input for public key generation and to be signed by the MSK so as to be trusted. This can make sure that there is no fake ID device involved in the secure communication.
Any unauthorized device with a fake ID can be identified immediately, since the digital signature verification will be invalid by its intended communicating counterpart. 
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Next the performance based on evaluation from Klinc et al. [23] and Rebali et al. [24] will be analyzed. All of the off-line processes will not be calculated. The calculation process is broken down into steps evaluated in [23] , they are: RNG (Random Number Generation), H (Hash), PM (Point Multiplication), PA (Point Addition), ENCB (Symmetric Encryption), DECB (Symmetric Decryption), all of the other XOR, multiplication and division will also be ignored, since they take too little time to impact the evaluation result. The main calculation time can be classified as expended by entity A and entity B.
Firstly, we calculate ECC signature verification time as: 1H + 2PM + 2PA, denoted as ECCSIG. Secondly, we calculate entity A's time cost:
Similarly entity B's time cost is:
According to the timing evaluation value in Table 10 . The evaluation time of both entities to complete the secure communication secret key establishing cryptography calculation is around 16.9ms, which can be marked as t key . The evaluation platform in referance [23] is a personal computer configured with Intel Pentium Dual CPU E2200 2.20GHz processor, 2048MB of RAM and Ubuntu 12.04.1LTS 32 bit operating system. Besides, the extra data overload transmitting time between entity A and B during secure channel setup should be considered. The length of ID is 10 bytes(MAC + IP address), the length of Hash is 20 bytes(SHA1), the length of public key signature and the two public keys are 28 bytes each (ECC-NIST192), the RND is 16 bytes in plaintext or symmetric encryption mode(AES-256), and 56 bytes in our proposed asymmetric encryption mode. So the total data overhead is:
Assume the data speed is 115200bps, the extra data transmission time is around: 19.2ms, can be marked as t data .
After the secure channel setup, the extra time expending is only the symmetric block encryption(AES-256), for a 256 bytes data package the extra time required for encryption or decryption is (256/16) × 0.0046 = 0.0736ms, can be marked as t comm .
For real system time cost the t key and t data should be estimated by adding up together, and t comm can be estimated separately.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper the trusted-ID referenced key scheme for setup the secure SCADA communication channel with the help of a device sDTU in end-paired mode is proposed.
This proposal will solve the unsafe problem in end-toend communication of SCADA systems in iron and steel plants or other applications with a practical and easy to implement solution.
The trusted-ID referenced idea will also make it easy for SCADA owners to clearly manage the assesses with a reliable identifier.
Though a relatively better approach for solving the SCADA secure communication problems is achieved, there are also some other points will be re-visited for the future study such as dynamically ID modification.
There will be another scenario for updating the ID information and related key pairs. And how to modify these sensitive information under authorization and access control also need to be further considered.
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